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[2017] PILARS CC 1 
 
A hoped for coherent and permissive EU religious 
freedom policy: the Bougnaoui and Achbita cases1 
Jessica Giles* 
 
The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has before it two similar cases, 
one from France and the other from Belgium, in which Advocate General Sharpston 
(UK) and Advocate General Kokott (Germany) have given their respective opinions. 
The cases are of interest in and of themselves because they provide the CJEU with 
the opportunity to examine religion as a protected characteristic under the operation 
of the Anti-Discrimination Directive, Council Directive 2000/78/EC. In addition they 
are important from a comparative perspective due to the Advocate Generals’ 
contrasting opinions on the protection accorded to religious believers within equality 
legislation which classes religious belief as a protected characteristic. This article will 
consider the Advocate Generals’ different approaches to the extent of protection 
enjoyed by those seeking to manifest their religion within a private employment 
context and examine some of the practical and theoretical issues to which the cases 
give rise.  
The two cases sit against a background that Advocate General Kokott in Achbita and 
another v G4S Secure Solutions NV (Case C-157/15) 31 May 2016, the reference 
from Belgium, describes in her opinion at paragraph 2 as: 
‘The legal issues surrounding the Islamic headscarf are symbolic of the more 
fundamental question of how much difference and diversity an open and pluralistic 
European society must tolerate within its borders and, conversely, how much 
assimilation it is permitted to require from certain minorities.’ 
And in paragraph 6, referring to the parallel case of Bougnaoui and another v 
Micropole SA (Case C-188/15) 13 July 2016, which originated in France: 
 
‘In both cases, the Court is expected to give a landmark decision the impact of 
which could extend beyond the specific context of the main proceedings and be 
ground breaking in the world of work throughout the European Union, at least so 
far as the private sector is concerned.’  
Ms Samira Achbita, a Muslim throughout her contract of employment, was employed 
in Belgium by G4S Secure Solutions NV (G4S), a company providing, inter alia, 
																																																											
1	This case comment is longer than the usual format for PILARs case comments. It was decided to 
publish in this format online to enable publication prior to the handing down of the decisions of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union in these cases.  
* SFHEA, Barrister, Law Lecturer at the Open University	
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security and reception services to customers from the public and private sectors.  Ms 
Achbita’s contract was one of indefinite duration. 
G4S had a policy, applicable at the commencement of Ms Achbita’s contract as an 
unwritten company rule, that employees were not permitted to wear any religious, 
political or philosophical symbols while on duty. A written formulation of this policy 
was incorporated into the G4S employee code of conduct three years after Ms 
Achbita’s employment commenced. This read: 
‘Employees are prohibited, in the workplace, from wearing any visible signs of 
their political, philosophical or religious beliefs and/or from giving expression to 
any ritual arising from them’. 
For the first three years Ms Achbita wore a headscarf outside work, but in 2006 she 
notified the company that she would be wearing a hijab (a headscarf covering the 
head and neck, but not the face) to work. This resulted in her dismissal one month 
later. She brought a claim for wrongful dismissal seeking alternatively damages for 
infringement of the law to combat discrimination. Both the court of first instance and 
the appeal court dismissed her claim on the basis that there was no indirect or direct 
discrimination and her dismissal could not be regarded as manifestly unreasonable 
or discriminatory since G4S was not under an obligation to assume that its ban was 
illegal. On an appeal in cassation the Court of Cassation, Belgium, referred the 
following question to the CJEU: 
‘Should article 2(2)(a) of Directive 2000/78/EC be interpreted as meaning that the 
prohibition on wearing, as a female Muslim, a headscarf at the workplace does not 
constitute direct discrimination where the employer’s rule prohibits all employees 
from wearing outward signs of political, philosophical and religious beliefs at the 
workplace’.  
Article 2 of the Directive reads: 
‘Direct discrimination shall be taken to occur where one person is treated less 
favourably than another is, has been or would be treated in a comparable 
situation, on any of the grounds referred to in Article 1; 
Indirect discrimination shall be taken to occur where an apparently neutral 
provision, criterion or practice would put persons having a particular religion or 
belief, a particular disability, a particular age, or a particular sexual orientation at a 
particular disadvantage compared with other persons unless: that provision, 
criterion or practice is objectively justified by a legitimate aim and the means of 
achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary’. 
Article 1 provides that the purpose of the Directive is to combat discrimination on the 
grounds of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation as regards 
employment and occupation with a view to putting into effect in the Member States 
the principle of equal treatment. National implementing legislation incorporated these 
provisions into national law.  
A parallel case concerning the wearing of the Muslim veil in a place of employment 
in the private sector arose in France and was referred to the CJEU. In that case Ms 
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Asma Bougnaoui, a Muslim, was employed as a design engineer by Micropole SA. 
In her interview Micropole made it clear to her that she would not be able to wear her 
veil in all circumstances in the interests of the business and for its development. 
Micropole explained that they were required to ask employees to use discretion 
concerning the expression of their personal preferences.  
After a client had explained to the company that Ms Bougnaoui’s wearing of the veil 
had embarrassed a number of their employees and that Ms Bougnaoui should not 
wear a veil the next time she attended them, Micropole requested that she did not 
wear her headscarf when she was in contact with customers of the business.  
Micropole cited the principle of necessary neutrality, which they required to be 
applied as regards their clients. Mrs Bougnaoui refused to comply with this request 
and Micropole terminated her contract of employment.  
The national court of first instance and the appeal court found that the dismissal was 
lawful. On the claimant’s appeal to the Court of Cassation, the court referred the 
following question to the CJEU: 
‘Must article 4(1) of [Directive 2000/78] be interpreted as meaning that the wish of 
a customer of an information technology consulting company no longer to have 
the information technology services of that company provided by an employee, a 
design engineer, wearing an Islamic headscarf, is a genuine and determining 
occupational requirement, by reason of the nature of the particular occupational 
activities concerned or of the context in which they are carried out?’  
Article 4(1) of the Directive reads: 
‘Notwithstanding Article 2(1) and (2), Member States may provide that a difference 
of treatment which is based on a characteristic related to any of the grounds 
referred to in Article 1 shall not constitute discrimination where, by reason of the 
nature of the particular occupational activities concerned or of the context in which 
they are carried out, such a characteristic constitutes a genuine and determining 
occupational requirement, provided that the objective is legitimate and the 
requirement is proportionate’. 
  
The Advocate Generals’ opinions 
Bougnaoui 
Advocate General Sharpston, in Bougnaoui, drew a clear distinction between 
freedom to manifest one’s religion, which included the freedom to wear religious 
symbols at work, and the ability to proselytise. In her opinion an employer was free 
to prohibit proselytism at work, whereas they could only limit the manifestation of 
religion in specific circumstances. She emphasised that she did not regard wearing 
religious symbols or attire as proselytism.    
She explained that she viewed the argument that just because an individual was 
wearing a religious garment (or was black or a woman) that they could not properly 
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undertake their role at an organisation as “pernicious”2 but that the wearing of the 
headscarf was an expression of cultural and religious freedom. 
In answer to the question of whether a customer’s request that one of the firms’ 
employees should not wear a hijab could be a genuine occupational requirement so 
as to justify religious discrimination, the Advocate General’s answer was that it could 
not.  
She reached this view by first concluding that freedom to manifest one’s religion 
(forum externum) as well as freedom to believe whatever one wants (forum 
internum), was covered by the prohibition against discrimination in Directive 2000/78. 
This was by analogy with European Court of Human Rights case law whereby the 
right to manifest ones’ religion was intrinsic to the freedom of religion itself. She then 
concluded that since someone who had not chosen to manifest their religion by 
wearing religious apparel would not have been treated in the same manner as Mrs 
Bouganoui, that Mrs Bouganoui had been directly discriminated against.  
The Advocate General then went on to explore whether any of the derogations laid 
down in the Directive applied. Addressing first whether the measure could be a 
genuine and determining occupational requirement pursuant to article 4(1) she 
concluded that the prohibition on the wearing of the hijab at the request of the client 
could not fulfil the requirements of this provision. Although the restriction was 
provided for by French law, and was based on a characteristic related to religious 
belief, restrictions under article 4(1) had to be interpreted strictly, the objective had to 
be both legitimate and the requirement proportionate. Article 4(1) could not be used 
to justify a blanket exception for all the activities that a given employee may 
potentially engage in. The restriction had to be both ‘genuine’ and ‘determining’ so 
that the derogation must be limited to matters that were absolutely necessary in 
order to undertake the professional activity in question3 . In this regard it would be 
acceptable for an employer to refuse to allow a Muslim employee to wear a hijab 
around machinery where to do so would create a dangerous situation. There was, 
however, no basis on which the grounds which Micropole appeared to advance in 
Ms Bougnaoui’s dismissal letter, namely the commercial interest of its business in its 
relations with its customers, that could justify the application of the Article 4(1) 
derogation. This was because direct discrimination could not be justified on the 
grounds that otherwise financial loss might be caused to the employer. Second at 
paragraph 100: 
‘… whilst the freedom to conduct a business is one of the general principles of EU 
law and is now enshrined in Article 16 of the Charter, the Court has held that that 
freedom ‘is not an absolute principle but must be viewed in relation to its function 
in society … Accordingly , limitations may be imposed on the exercise of that 
freedom provided, in accordance with Article 52(1) of the Charter, that they are 
prescribed by law and that, in accordance with the principle of proportionality, they 
are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by 
the European Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others’.  
																																																											
2 Bougnaoui, para 74. 
3 Bougnaoui, para 96.	
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Thus other rights would and had been4 given priority over freedom to conduct a 
business.  
Similarly here the freedom to conduct a business could not, according to Advocate 
General Sharpston, cause the limitation upon Mrs Bougnaoui’s freedom to manifest 
her religion to amount to a genuine and determining occupational requirement. To 
rule otherwise would ‘normalise’ the derogation proposed by Micropole5. There was 
nothing to suggest that because she wore an Islamic headscarf Mrs Bougnaoui was 
unable to perform her duties as a design engineer – her dismissal letter had, on the 
contrary, referred to her competence in this area.  
Since none of the other derogations under the Directive were applicable, the 
discrimination was, according to the Advocate General, therefore unjustified direction 
discrimination6. 
Advocate General Sharpston went on to consider the situation if the policy had been 
one which imposed a neutral dress code on all employees (this was akin to the facts 
in Achbita). She concluded that such a rule would amount to indirect discrimination 
against those who sought to manifest their religious belief7.   
The potential for limiting the manifestation of religion in cases of indirect 
discrimination was wider than that available pursuant to article 4(1), limitations were 
required to be objectively justified by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving 
them were required to be proportionate and necessary, pursuant to article 2(2)(b)(i). 
Advocate General Sharpston reasoned that protection of an employer’s business 
could be a legitimate aim under article 2(2)(b)(i) so that the right to manifest religion 
could be limited in the commercial interests of an employer. This would be the case 
where the employer wanted to project a particular image to his clients or customers. 
However this was not an absolute principle and for an observant member of a faith 
religious identity was integral to that person’s very being such that the manifestation 
of that faith would accompany the individual everywhere. Given that the case gave 
rise to the clash of two protected rights, it was necessary to find accommodation 
between them.  
Proportionality required a balance between the right of the employee to wear 
religious symbols and the right of the business to impose restrictions8. The Advocate 
General explained that accommodation would involve, for example, requiring an 
employee to wear a hijab of a particular colour. The employees right to do a job on 
their own terms was not absolute, however an employee should not readily be told 
that they could find employment elsewhere9. It was necessary to find a solution that 
lay between these alternatives provided that this did not undermine the aspect of the 
employee’s manifestation of religion that they viewed as essential10. The balance 
																																																											
4 Bougnaoui, para 97. 
5 Bougnaoui, para 101. 
6 Bougnaoui, para 108. 
7 Bougnaoui, para 110. 
8 Bougnaoui, para 122.	
9	This was an endorsement of the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in Eweida and 
others v United Kingdom [2013] ECHR 37; (2013) OJLR 2(1): 218-220 
10 Bouganoui, para 128.	
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would favour the employee where the employee sought to wear only some form of 
headgear that left the face and eyes entirely clear, there was no justification for the 
prohibition of the wearing of such headgear.  In the last resort, the business interest 
in generating maximum profit should give way to the right of the individual employee 
to manifest their religious convictions. Where a customer of the business placed a 
requirement on the business based on prejudice relating to one of the protected 
characteristics it was dangerous to allow an employer to discriminate against an 
employee in order to pander to that prejudice.  
The judgment of the CJEU in this case is awaited at the time this case comment was 
authored.  
 
Achbita 
The question referred to the Court in the Achbita case was whether the measure in 
place gave rise to direct discrimination.  
Although the reference was concerned with employment in the private sphere, 
Advocate General Kokott first considered France’s argument that article 4(2) TEU, 
which requires the Union to respect member state identities inherent in their 
fundamental structures political and constitutional, combined with article 3(1) of the 
Directive, which states that the Directive only applies to areas within EU 
competence, meant that the Directive had to give way to a state’s constitutional 
principle of secularism (laïcité) concerning employment in the public sphere.  
In response to this argument Advocate General Kokott opined at paragraph 32: 
‘The European Union’s obligation under Article 4(2) TEU to respect the national 
identities of its Member States does not in itself support the inference that certain 
subject areas or areas of that directive must not adversely affect the national 
identities of the Member States. National identity does not therefore limit the 
scope of the Directive as such, but must be duly taken into account in the 
interpretation of the principle of equal treatment which it contains and of the 
grounds of justification for any differences of treatment.’  
Advocate General Kokott was of the same opinion as Advocate General Sharpston 
that the term ‘religion’ in article 1 of the Directive included not only the faith of an 
individual (forum internum) but also the practice or manifestation of that religion 
(forum externum). Further that the wearing of a headscarf was a manifestation of 
religious belief.  
Referring to previous Court of Justice case law under the Directive Advocate 
General Kokott acknowledged that where a measure was inseparably linked to the 
relevant reason for difference in treatment, the court had always found discrimination 
to be present11. She distinguished these cases from Ms Achbita’s case on the basis 
																																																											
11 For example Dekker v Stichting Vormingscentrum voor Jong Volwassenen (VJV-Centrum) Plus (C-
177/88), [1991] IRLR 27, paras 12 and 17 and more recently CHEZ Razpredelenie Bulgaria AD v 
Komisia za Zashtita ot Diskriminatsia (C-83/14) [2015] IRLR 746, paras 76, 91 and 95. 
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that they were related to an individual’s ‘immutable characteristics’ either physical or 
personal, such as gender, age or sexual orientation, rather than on modes of 
conduct based on ‘a subjective decision or conviction’, such as the wearing or not of 
a head covering. In her opinion since this was not a case concerned with immutable 
characteristics it could not constitute direct discrimination.  
In any event the fact that the ban related to all religious symbols, not just the wearing 
of the hijab, so that it could affect a Christian wearing a crucifix or a Jew wearing the 
kippah or Sikh who wished to wear a Dastar (turban) and it applied to political and 
philosophical beliefs meant that it was accordingly ‘neutral from the point of view of 
ideology’12  
Explaining at paragraph 52: 
‘that requirement of neutrality affects a religious employee in exactly the same 
way that it affects a confirmed atheist who expresses his anti-religious stance in a 
clearly visible manner by the way he dresses, or a politically active employee … ‘ 
The Advocate General acknowledged that if the policy were aimed at those with 
religious beliefs alone then it would be appropriate to assume direct discrimination 
based on religion. In this case, however, given the broad scope of the measure, the 
comparator applied to discern whether there had been discrimination was between 
an employee who did not wish to express any form of belief and one who did.  The 
difference in treatment between these groups was not made on the basis of religion 
and therefore there was no direct discrimination.  
Having found there was no direct discrimination and accordingly answered the 
question posed by the referring court, Advocate General Kokott then went on to 
consider the situation in respect of indirect discrimination on the basis that Ms 
Achbita may have been put at a particular disadvantage as a result of the policy. She 
concluded that even if there were indirect discrimination it was justified. 
This was because the measure pursued the legitimate aims of being genuine and 
determining occupational requirements pursuant to article 4(1) of the Directive and 
they were necessary for the protection of the rights of others pursuant to article 2(5), 
namely the right of the company to run its business. 
The Advocate General pointed out that the practice of the national courts on the 
issue of legitimate aim was inconsistent; Centrum (the interested party), Belgium and 
France were of the view that the aim was not legitimate, the Commission was 
sceptical on the point. Only G4S was of the view that it was legitimate.  
Advocate General Kokott opined first that the measure could be considered 
legitimate as a genuine and determining occupational requirement. This was 
because a genuine occupational requirement could relate not only to the operational 
processes but also the context in which the activities were carried out and the 
conditions under which services were provided13. An undertaking might legitimately 
decide to pursue a policy of neutrality and thereby require its staff to refrain from 
																																																											
12 Achbita, para 51.	
13 Achbita, paras 74-75. 
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wearing symbols that demonstrated any form of ideology. Difference in treatment in 
this regard could be justified on economic or business grounds under strict 
conditions laid down by EU law.14 
Advocate General Kokott reasoned that the employer must be allowed a degree of 
discretion in the pursuit of its business on the basis of ‘the fundamental right of 
freedom to conduct a business’ 15 [my emphasis added]. She opined that an 
employer may require its workers to behave and dress in a particular way at work in 
circumstances where the company had a policy which it had formulated in particular 
where employees came face to face with customers. Therefore the ban could be a 
genuine and determining occupational requirement.  
The Advocate General went on to explain that the imposition of a dress code could 
only be legitimate if it was in itself legitimate and complied with EU law. A business 
could not promote an inhuman ideology but could take into account the views of its 
customer and business partners, although it could not pander blindly to every 
demand16. 
Her view was that the policy of neutrality was ‘absolutely crucial’ to G4S because of 
the variety of customers it served and the special nature of its work, namely the 
constant face-to-face contact with external individuals. This had a defining impact on 
G4S itself and that of its customers. It was important that G4S customers should not 
be associated with the religious or political beliefs of their staff17.  
Importantly at paragraph 99: 
‘In a case such as this, the proportionality test is a delicate matter in the context of 
which the Court of Justice, following the practice of the ECtHR in relation to Article 
9 ECHR and Article 14 ECHR should grant the national authorities, in particular 
the national courts, a measure of discretion which they may exercise in strict 
accordance with EU rules. In this regard, the Luxembourg Court does not 
necessarily have to prescribe a solution that is uniform throughout the EU. Rather, 
it would be sufficient for the Court to indicate to the national court all of the 
material factors that it must take into account in carrying out the proportionality 
test but otherwise to leave to that court the actual task of striking a balance 
between the substantive interest involved.’ 
The ban was in the opinion of the Advocate General appropriate for achieving the 
legitimate aim specified and was consistently applied and necessary for achieving 
the stated aim of an employer’s policy of neutrality amongst all its staff, any other 
accommodation would defeat this objective.  
Her opinion was that since religion, unlike sex, skin colour, age or a person’s 
disability, was not an unalterable fact but was something an employee ‘could leave 
at the door’ upon entering their place of work, an employee could be expected to 
moderate their expression of religion in accordance with an employers requirements.  
																																																											
14 Achbita, para 79. 
15 Achbita, para 81. 
16 Achbita, paras 88-89. 
17 Achbita, para 94.	
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The decisive criteria in determining the proportionality of the restriction upon the 
employee was how visible and conspicuous the manifestation was. Employees 
required to wear uniform could expect greater restrictions placed upon them. Those 
working higher up in the corporate hierarchy and those with external facing roles 
could expect greater limitations on their religious freedom. It was important to 
consider whether as a result of the restriction of religious freedom other restrictions, 
such as those on grounds of sex, were also present. Also it was appropriate to 
consider the broader context of the conflict between the employer and the employee. 
According to Advocate General Kokott it was not appropriate to rush to the 
conclusion that such a measure made it unduly difficult for Muslim women to 
integrate into work and society and it was important to bear in mind the constitutional 
settlement in place within a member state and in which the business operated, this 
might make it more appropriate to impose a restriction in some states rather than 
others.  
Advocate General Kokott concluded that although it was for the member state to 
resolve the matter, in her opinion such a ban as that proposed by G4S did not unduly 
prejudice the interests of the employee and was accordingly proportionate and 
therefore a justified interference in Ms Achbita’s freedom to manifest her religion.  
With regard to justification on the basis of article 2(5) (rather than article 4(1) dealt 
with above) it could not be ruled out that article 2(5) permitted a derogation from the 
prohibition against discrimination, where an employer was claiming freedom to 
conduct a business. Such a measure, however, had to be authorised by a public 
authority. A rule, such as the measure implemented by G4S, had not been issued by 
a public authority and article 2(5) did not therefore add anything over and above the 
principles applied pursuant to article 4(1).  
The judgment of the CJEU in this case is awaited at the time this case comment was 
authored. 
 
Analysis 
There are instantly identifiable differences between these two cases. Achbita 
concerns a general policy applicable to all employees, prohibiting the expression of 
not just religious beliefs but political and philosophical ones as well. In Bougnaoui the 
measure is, on one interpretation, just limited to Mrs Bougnaoui or, on another 
interpretation, limited to the manifestation of religious beliefs. Both cases are 
distinguishable from case law covering employment in the public sphere. This is 
because the courts, both national and regional (the ECtHR) have established that it 
is acceptable in some states (although not in Denmark, the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom18) that different policy considerations apply in the public sector 
where the state can go further to impose its own ideological foundations for 
																																																											
18 Bougnaoui, para 39. 
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governance on those working in its service19. In France, where the Laic model is in 
place in the regulation of relations between the state and individuals in the public 
square, public authorities can refuse to allow their employees to wear religious 
symbols or garments. This occurred most recently in Ebrahimian v France [2015] 
ECHR 1041 where a social worker was according to the ECtHR legitimately 
dismissed for refusing to take off her hijab when a patient explained their discomfort 
at being dealt with by someone in this attire20. 
The differences between the facts of Bougnaoui and Achbita could ultimately lead 
the court to come to different conclusions as to whether there was direct or indirect 
discrimination. However to find that the interference with religious freedom rights was 
justified in either case would involve the court at some point in ignoring the essence 
of the nature of the right to manifestation of religion, denying the relationship of 
religious belief to human dignity and according too much weight to business interests 
in the balancing exercise.  
In both cases the Advocate Generals focussed on the measure as a genuine and 
determining occupational requirement and it was clear from their conclusions that 
they came from directly opposed theoretical standpoints concerning the status of 
religious freedom as a protected characteristic and the nature of that right. It is this 
difference that has implications more broadly because it demonstrates how difficult it 
will be moving forward for the Court of Justice to adjudicate in this area, in particular 
in view of the fact that according to article 17 TFEU (and not only article 4 TEU), the 
EU does not (theoretically) engage in matters concerning religion. When the issue is 
not only related to the individual manifestation of religion but the case concerns 
criteria related to the constitutional settlement in place between member states and 
their citizens then the Court is touching on the very essence of that which relates to 
member state sovereignty. (Taking account of the varying member state 
constitutional settlements was suggested by Advocate General Kokott in her criteria 
for determining justification for the interference with religious freedom). It is here that 
neo-functional arguments supporting uniform approaches in the interests of general 
economic well-being are at their weakest and are unlikely to override deeper 
constitutional concerns. Similarly arguments concerning solidarity of the Union will 
likewise struggle to triumph. This is because finding a compromise which involves 
levelling up or levelling down in terms of the public acceptance or otherwise of 
religion is unlikely to be acceptable to the cross section of constitutional settlements 
within member states21 and also because it is unnecessary and potentially 
																																																											
19 The distinction between the application of laïcité in the public and private spheres is further 
discussed by Eoin Daly, ‘Laïcité in the Private Sphere? French Religious Liberty After the Baby-Loup 
Affair’ (2016) OJLR 5(2): 211.  
20 Ebrahimian v France [2015] ECHR 1041; (2016) OJLR 5(2): 365-366. See also the case comment 
by Sabina Garahan ‘A right to Discriminate? Widening the Scope for Interference with Religious 
Rights in Ebrahimian v France’ (2016) OJLR 5(3): 352-358.	
21 Various constitutional models demonstrating a variety of constitutional settlements between the 
state and citizens vis-à-vis religion are in place throughout Europe: see Rex Ahdar and Ian Leigh 
(2013) ‘Models of Religion-State Relations’, Chapter 4 in Religious Freedom in the Liberal State, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford 87-124. Although contrast Norman Doe (2011) Law and Religion in 
	 11	
damaging. As McIlroy notes when writing on the concept of sphere sovereignty and 
subsidiarity, maximising local governance is optimum for the well being of 
humankind22. This is particularly so when it comes to individual and group enjoyment 
of religious freedom. Many EU citizens who hold a faith may well have already taken 
decisions which preference faith over economic well-being23. Where this attitude 
within a state is strong it will not necessarily tow the EU line if it feels the essence of 
its constitutional settlement vis-à-vis religion interfered with. This is not to deny the 
importance of basic levels of economic well-being but to recognise that human 
choices are not always primarily driven by this goal.  
It is the opposing views of the nature of religion as a protected characteristic that 
mark this deep difference of ideology between the Advocate Generals. These are 
expressed as follows: 
Advocate Kokott in Achbita at paragraph 116 states: 
‘However, unlike sex, skin colour, ethnic origin, sexual orientation, age or a 
person’s disability, the practice of religion is not so much an unalterable fact as an 
aspect of an individual’s private life, and one moreover, over which the employees 
concerned can choose to exert an influence. While an employee cannot ‘leave’ his 
sex, skin colour, ethnicity, sexual orientation, age or disability ‘at the door’ upon 
entering his employee’s premises, he may be expected to moderate the exercise 
of his religion in the workplace, be this in relation to religious practices, religiously 
motivated behaviour or (as in the present case) his clothing.  
Advocate General Sharpston on the other hand at paragraph 118 of Bougnaoui 
states: 
‘Here, I emphasise that, to someone who is an observant member of a faith, 
religious identity is an integral part of that person’s very being. The requirements 
of one’s faith – its discipline and the rules that it lays down for conducting one’s 
life – are not elements that are to be applied when outside work (say, in the 
evenings and during weekends for those who are in an office job) but that can 
politely be discarded during working hours. Of course, depending on the particular 
rules of the religion in question and the particular individual’s level of observance, 
this or that element may be non-compulsory for that individual and therefore 
negotiable. But it would be entirely wrong to suppose that, whereas one’s sex and 
skin colour accompany one everywhere, somehow one’s religion does not.’ 
Advocate General Kokott’s opinion is contradicted by empirical evidence over 
centuries indicating that individuals are prepared to suffer martyrdom rather than 
																																																																																																																																																																																									
Europe, A Comparative Introduction, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1-2, who downplays this 
difference and finds strong similarities in approach. 
22 David McIlroy ‘Subsidiarity and Sphere Sovereignty: Christian Reflections on the Size, Shape and 
Scope of Government’, (2003) 151 Law and Justice 111 - 136	
23	74%	of	EU	citizens	claim	to	adhere	to	the	Christian	faith.	
	 12	
deny their faith24, and would certainly be prepared to leave employment rather than 
refrain from doing so25.  
It would be illogical to conclude that faith could be left at the door by an employee of 
a particular faith when, in some parts of the world, faith was so essential to the very 
being of adherents to their faith that they were prepared to die for it.  Even in 
situations where the issue is not one of life or death, empirical research has 
demonstrated that employees choose to leave their employment rather than 
disengage with the symbols or practice of their faith26. As Advocate General 
Sharpston pointed out it cannot be said that faith is something one can leave at the 
door of one’s work.  
Advocate General Kokott takes her ideological approach to religion as a protected 
characteristic further when she equates the restriction on the expression of political 
and philosophical belief with that of religious belief. The European Court of Human 
Rights has ruled in Eweida that a manifestation of belief must reach a certain level of 
cogency to be accorded protection under article 9 of the ECHR, the same would go 
for a political or philosophical belief. In considering whether a particular manifestation 
of religion could gain the protection of article 9 it explained that a 'manifestation' of 
religion had to be intimately linked to the religion or belief in so far as there had to be 
a sufficiently close and direct nexus between the act and the underlying belief, which 
had to be determined on the facts of each case. There was, in particular, no 
requirement on the applicant to establish that he or she acted in fulfillment of a duty 
mandated by the religion in question27. 
While it has been established that political and philosophical beliefs are protected 
along with religious beliefs under both article 9 ECHR and equality legislation, 
demonstrating that a particular manifestation has such a close connection that an 
employee is required to manifest that belief at work is more difficult to imagine. It is 
difficult to think of examples of manifestations of political or philosophical belief that 
would reach the level of cogency and demonstrate a sufficiently close and direct 
nexus between the act and underlying belief such that it would give rise to protection 
under the Equality legislation in a work environment. Usually this type of belief is 
protected by way of the right to freedom of expression, pursuant to article 10 ECHR 
																																																											
24 The Vatican puts the figure of Christian martyrs at 100,000 a year. 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-24864587 . OpenDoors puts the figure at 322 Christians per 
month: http://tinyurl.com/jpyavyx with 772 per month suffering some form of violence. Research puts 
the figure of Christians martyred since the time of Jesus at 70 million: http://tinyurl.com/zpjeky6 . This 
is greater than the population of the United Kingdom (64 million) and France (66 million) and over six 
times the population of Belgium (11 million). These are just the statistics for martyrs of the Christian 
faith. See also the Prince of Wales, Thought for the Day 22 December 2016: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p04m6dlk  
25 Advocate General Kokott’s reasoning has been described as an aberration and directly contrary to 
European values: Brasseur Guillaume ‘Le droit européen de la discrimination, un maelström 
d’incohe ́rence? Entre beaux principes et réalités pratiques’, Masters dissertation. (Louvain): 
http://tinyurl.com/j5ams3x   
 
26 The Reverend David Randolph-Horn ‘Spirituality at Work: Perspectives of Christians, Muslims and 
those of General Spirituality and Belief’. PhD thesis (2015) Leeds Beckett University: 
http://tinyurl.com/z4crro7 . 
27 Eweida et al v United Kingdom [2013] ECHR 37; (2013) OJLR 2(1): 218-220, paras 81-82.	
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rather than pursuant to article 9 ECHR.28 The question as to whether there has been 
discrimination therefore needs to focus on those with cogent beliefs which require 
manifestation within a work environment which come within the remit of legislation as 
protected characteristics and compare them with those who do not29.  
The importance of religious belief to human identity and dignity is demonstrated in 
rights theory and international rights instruments that accord freedom of religion the 
status of a fundamental right, although the manifestation of that right can be subject 
to limitations. To raise, as advocate General Kokott does, the freedom to run a 
business to the status of ‘fundamental’ human right and down grade freedom of 
religion as a protected characteristic is to accord too high a status to business 
freedom particularly in the context of the horizontal application of fundamental rights 
law which is the situation in the Achbita and Bougnaoui cases. The Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union is addressed to member states and EU 
institutions, it has vertical application, that is application between citizens and the 
member states or the institutions of the EU. By bringing it into play in the balancing 
of Charter rights under equality legislation this results in the horizontal application of 
rights between private individuals, including corporate individuals. If the companies 
can call article 16, freedom to run a business into aid, then, depending on how the 
horizontal application of fundamental rights operates within a member state, the 
employees could potentially call article 15, ‘the right to engage in work and to pursue 
a freely chosen or accepted occupation’ into aid.  
 
Where a company denies an individual the right to manifest their religion and that 
individual is thereby obliged to leave their employment the company is interfering 
with their right to engage in work and pursue their accepted occupation. This is 
particularly so if, as Advocate General Sharpston opined, the corporate policies 
established by G4S and Micropole become the norm. Individuals could eventually be 
unable to find employment in their chosen profession elsewhere. This demonstrates 
the impact of what has been described as ‘rights inflation’ and an expansive view of 
rights and the role of the judiciary in adapting rights frameworks30. 
 
The balancing of fundamental civil rights in the present cases indicates the effect 
that economic integration at a supranational level has had upon the understanding of 
human dignity and the worth of individuals where law is primarily economic in its 
underlying rationale31. Even though the EU has sought for some time to move 
																																																											
28	For	example	an	attempt	by	an	Irish	Republican	prisoner	to	exercise	the	right	to	wear	an	Easter	Lily	was	
considered	under	article	10	ECHR:	see	Neil	Graffin	(2012)	‘Donaldson	v	United	Kingdom:	No	right	for	prisoners	
to	wear	Easter	Lilies’.	KLJ	23(1):	101-108.	
29 The extent to which beliefs are protected pursuant to UK equality legislation is discussed by 
Professors Peter Edge and Lucy Vickers (2016) in their ‘Review of equality and human rights law 
relating to religion or belief.’ Equality and Human Rights Commission Research report 97, 15-21: 
http://tinyurl.com/z9pltop . The criteria for ‘belief’ in the UK are that it must be genuinely held; it must 
be a belief and not an opinion; it must concern a weighty and substantial aspect of human life and 
behaviour; it must attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance; be worthy 
of respect in a democratic society, not be incompatible with human dignity or conflict with fundamental 
rights: Grainger Plc v Nicholson [2010] IRLR 4, explained in Edge and Vickers (2016), 16-18. 
30 See for example Kai Möller (2012) The Global Model of Constitutional Rights. Oxford University 
Press, Oxford.  
31 Academic commentators continue to put forward various underlying theories supporting the 
structure of the European Union ranging from forms of federalism through to inter-governmentalism. 
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beyond the theoretical foundations of functionalism and neo-functionalism as 
providing an underlying rationale for action and has introduced the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and policies to flank factor mobility there are still strong 
underlying tendencies and reasoning within the Court of Justice which reinforce 
uniformity, integration and its economic rational32. Combined with a failure by policy 
makers and institutions to more conscientiously apply the doctrine of subsidiarity, in 
particular after the Treaty of Lisbon, this means that potentially past jurisprudence 
combined with present fundamental rights provisions could now enable the Court of 
Justice to raise freedom to run a business to a higher level than a long 
acknowledged fundamental civil and political right33.   
The point of human dignity is that the human being is seen as of value in and of 
themselves whether from a theological point of view or otherwise34. Human rights 
seek to avoid the instrumentalisation of human beings. While it is of course important 
that an economy functions and businesses can thrive, there is no suggestion that 
this is incompatible with the enjoyment of the existing body of fundamental rights. On 
the contrary there is evidence that where freedom of religion is practiced within a 
corporate set up business in fact thrives35. This is achievable without according 
business freedom the status of a fundamental right.  
This distinction between the positions of each Advocate General is of importance 
because it establishes a distinct starting point. If one recognises faith as intrinsic to 
an individual and to their dignity, the extent to which one can interfere with that right 
is very limited. If one considers faith as non-essential then even if direct or indirect 
																																																																																																																																																																																									
What is clear from the reasoning of the Court of Justice is that the Court will bear in mind the need to 
further the integrative purposes of the Union and work for cohesion: Robert Schütze (2015) European 
Union Law Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 43-76. Damien Chamlers, Gareth Davies and 
Giorgio Monti, European Union Law, (2014) 3rd ed, Cambridge University Law, Cambridge, 4-11 and 
14-19, Paul Craig and Grainne De Burca EU Law Text, Cases and Materials, (2015) 6th ed, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 23-27. Gunnar Beck (2012), The Legal Reasoning of the Court of Justice of 
the EU. Hart Publishing, Oxford.	
32 For example the Cassis de Dijion line of cases applicable in the field of free movement of goods, 
and the principles subsequently applied in other areas of factor mobility: Rewe-Zentral AG v 
Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein (1979) Case 120/78, [1979] ECR I-649 
33 Nicholas Wolterstorff grounds rights in the respect due to the worth of the rights-holder and, taking 
a Christian theological approach, connects this with God’s relationship with humankind: see Nicholas 
Wolterstorff (2008) Justice Rights and Wrongs, Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford, 
2008. Ahdar and Leigh (2013) in Chapters 2 and 3 examine historical and present day justification for 
religious freedom. These accounts do not sit well with a theory that incorporates the running of a 
business for profit as a fundamental right in a balancing exercise with religious freedom. While some 
form of accommodation between a corporation and employee may well be necessary, to allow the 
profit motive to enter the exercise of accommodation as a fundamental right is to balance the scales 
unfairly.  
34 For a philosophically sophisticated and nuanced exploration of the grounding of rights see 
Wolterstorff, in particular 313 et segue. 
35 For example Dr Brian Grim’s work at the Religious Freedom and Business Foundation: 
see, for example, http://religiousfreedomandbusiness.org/religions-economic-value  and 
Economy with a Truly Human Purpose: http://www.newyorkencounter.org/2017-economy-
with-a-truly-human-purpose/ . See also Apostolic Exhortation Evangelii Gaudium of the Holy 
Father Francis to the bishops, clergy, consecrated persons and the lay faithful on the proclamation of 
the gospel in today’s world: http://tinyurl.com/hhyf9za , chapter 2.1 Some Challenges of Today’s 
World.  
	 15	
discrimination comes into play, the right to express that freedom of religion can be 
more easily denied because other ‘essential’ rights can by their very nature trump it 
or limitations can be more easily justified or weighed in the balance.  
There is, however, no indication in the legislation that religion is any less of a 
protected characteristic than other protected characteristics such as sex, skin colour 
or sexual orientation and to so find would result in the Court stepping outside the 
tools of statutory interpretation available to it36 and take it beyond the policy making 
role it has on occasion assumed for itself37. This is because it would be realigning 
the system of fundamental rights protection in place at a regional and international 
level. This goes beyond causing a constitutional restructuring such as that put in 
place at the time the Court established direct effect38 indirect effect39 and bolstered 
factor mobility40. It involves the court in unravelling the system that was put in place 
to ensure that never again could a sector of society gain such power that it could 
trample on human dignity and abuse rights essential to humankind. These norms sit 
above individual constitutional settlements at both regional and international levels 
and it would be inappropriate for the CJEU, in an area in which technically the EU 
does not have competence and when addressing the horizontal application of rights, 
to interfere with norms of such import. This is reinforced by article 53 of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the EU, this states: 
‘Nothing in this Charter shall be interpreted as restricting or adversely affecting 
human rights and fundamental freedoms as recognised, in their respective fields 
of application, by Union law and international law and by international agreements 
to which the Union, the Community or all the Member States are party, including 
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, and by the Member States’ constitutions.’  
 
Of importance in Advocate General Sharpston’s opinion41 and absent in Advocate 
General Kokott’s opinion is the comment that not all individuals of a particular faith 
will adhere to all the various manifestations of that faith, and while some may move 
into a deeper observance, others may pull out of it42. To assume as Advocate 
																																																											
36 Beck (2012) identifies a cumulative approach to judicial reasoning in cases where the CJEU is 
dealing with constitutional or human rights issues which involves it emphasising a purposive approach 
based inter alia on conceptual vagueness and ‘value pluralism’.  
37 Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen Case C-26/62and subsequent 
authority: see Beck, p 299.	
38 Van Gend en Loos  
39 Von Colson and Kamann v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen (Case 14/83) [1984] ECR 1891 and 
Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacional de Alimentacion SA (Case C-106/89) [1990] ECR I-4135 
40 Cassis de Dijon 
41 Bougnaoui, para 29. 
42 Bougnaoui, para 29. ‘It is often (perhaps generally) the case that not all of a particular religion’s 
compendium of religious practice is perceived by someone who adheres to that religion as absolutely 
‘core’ to his or her own religious observance. Religious observance comes in varying forms and 
varying intensities. What a particular person treats as essential to his or her religious observance may 
also vary over time. That is because it is relatively usual for levels of personal belief, and hence of 
personal observance associated with that belief, to evolve as a person passes through life. Some 
become less observant over time; others, more so. … the level of religious observance may likewise 
fluctuate over the course of the religious year. An enhance level or observance – which the 
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General Kokott does that just because an individual does not adhere to every tenet 
of the faith over a period of time that faith cannot be essential to the individual 
ignores the well-documented manner in which individuals grow and develop within 
their faith43.  
If the CJEU were to follow the logic of Advocate General Kokott’s opinion it would 
involve it not only altering the structure of fundamental rights protection within a 
considerable portion of Council of Europe states, ignoring  the role that religion plays 
in the dignity and very being of those who hold a faith and ignoring the manner in 
which those of faith can develop over time, but it would also involve it stepping 
outside its usual modus operandi. This is because Advocate General Kokott 
suggested a non-uniform approach sensitive to individual member states settlements 
vis-à-vis religion would be acceptable. The CJEU has consistently refused to take 
such an approach, having an overarching policy of uniformity, solidarity and 
cohesion of the Union in their decision making44.  
The Advocate General refers to the acceptability of member states applying 
individual approaches to this area so that they could take into account the particular 
ideology within a member state. This is despite the fact that those states making 
representations in the Achbita and Bougnaoui cases, including France, did not want 
the matter resolved in a way that would enable businesses to apply state ideology 
within a private corporate context.  
Permitting an individual state approach would give rise to an additional problem in 
that it would enable the court to absolve itself from assessing whether a state 
ideology itself might breach international rights norms – a function with which, as a 
result of incorporation of religious freedom as a protected characteristic in anti-
discrimination legislation and attempts by private corporations to apply state ideology 
to employees, it is to charged under the Directive.  
On a practical level this is problematic because even if the Court of Justice could 
break with tradition and allow a non-uniform approach to the interpretation of the 
Directive, over time the Court has shown a tendency to chip away at a position until 
the state of affairs it seeks to achieve becomes acceptable to member states – by 
ruling that a ‘neutral’ policy was acceptable for private corporations within one 
member state, this would be a first step potentially on the road to a secular/laic 
approach in the adjudication of such disputes where uniformity was eventually 
imposed.  
Second, practically, an individual state approach would make it difficult for 
multinational companies operating across Europe since employees within different 
states would have different policies applied to them and employees who crossed 
borders would be able to put on or have to take off religious attire in accordance with 
the requirements in place. The corporate image that weighed so heavily in the 
																																																																																																																																																																																									
practitioner may feel it appropriate to manifest in a variety of ways – may therefore be associated with 
particular points in the religious year’ 
43 See for example James Fowler’s Stages of Faith: http://tinyurl.com/odby8q6		
44 Beck (2012), 319, describes the reference to ‘ever closer union’ in the preambles of the TEU and 
the TFEU as the letimotif which pervades the actions and decisions of the EU institutions.   
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balance in Advocate General Kokott’s opinion could not actually be achieved for 
multi-national companies where differences within member states were allowed45. 
The requirements on the Court of Justice in terms of the context in which it decides 
cases may therefore hamper its ability to allow states’ ideological difference when it 
comes to religious freedom in a corporate context. This contrasts with the European 
Court of Human Rights, this can accord member states a margin of appreciation 
where, in the absence of consensus, it feels that the individual state has not 
overstepped the boundary in terms of infringing an individuals’ fundamental rights46. 
This greater freedom on the part of the European Court of Human Rights to permit 
national difference flows from the nature of its remit – its focus is on rights protection 
alone. 
If the court is compelled to take a uniform approach to the issue, on the basis that 
those member states that were party to the cases would support a finding of either 
unjustified direct or indirect discrimination this would not cause it to be at risk of 
upsetting member states with such a finding. It would not impinge on existing state 
ideology applied in public employment nor that applied in public life and to that extent 
would allow national difference. The uniform approach would occur in refusing to 
allow customers of private businesses to demand racist policies in respect of that 
employers’ staff. It would also not be at risk of undermining the external relations 
work of the EU in the field of religious freedom and in particular the work of Dr Ján 
Figeľ, the EU Special Envoy for Religious Freedom outside the EU. Its internal policy 
would coherently support tolerance between those of all faiths, in the corporate 
sphere at least, and also boost religious freedom more generally, which in the view 
of the EU Special Envoy is essential if other fundamental rights are to be protected47. 
The EU Guidelines for the Protection and Promotion of Freedom of Religion and 
Belief explain at 1.A.1 that:  
‘Violations of freedom of religion or belief may exacerbate intolerance and often 
constitute early indicators of potential violence and conflicts.’48  
																																																											
45 As Advocate General Sharpston points out in Bougnaoui, para 36, member states’ treatment of the 
wearing of religious apparel differs widely from state to state. Blanket bans on the face veil in public 
exist in France and Belgium. In Germany for public sector teachers to be denied the right to wear a 
religious symbol there has to be specific identifiable risk. In Denmark, the Netherlands and the UK 
there are no restrictions and also no formal distinctions between employees in public and private 
sector 
46 Comparative analysis on the operation of the ECtHR and the CJEU in the field of religious freedom 
protection has been undertaken in a series of articles published in the Oxford Journal of Law and 
Religion and introduced by Katayoun Alidadi and Marie-Claire Foblets, European Supranational 
Courts and the Fundamental Right to Freedom of Religion or Belief: Convergence of Competition? 
(2016) OJLR 5(3): 532-540. The Achbita and Bougnaoui cases are discussed in this series by 
Eugenia Relaño Pastor Towards Substantive Equality for Religious Believers in the Workplace: Two 
Supranational European Courts, Two Different Approaches. (2016) OJLR 5(2): 255. 
47 Dr Ján Figeľ, EU Special Envoy for Freedom of Religion outside the EU at the OpenDoors National 
Conference, Archbishop’s Palace Vienna November 2016 : 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NYojlodpxIs. Opening of the European Academy of Religion in 
Italy December 2016: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QE_-0tpmEfE. Institute for Cultural 
Diplomacy: Annual Conference January 2017:  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iimjLKoGk6g.   
48 EU Guidelines for Protection and Promotion of Freedom of Religion and Belief. Council of the 
European Union (2013/2082(INI)). https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/137585.pdf  
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It is on the basis of this message that the EU seeks to reach out to third countries. 
Annicchino points to both the importance of and challenges in creating internal and 
external coherence in the field of religious freedom within the EU49. Coherence and 
credibility would, however, seem vital in order to gain respect and enter into dialogue 
with third countries. Annicchino suggests that: 
‘there must be room for a degree of pluralism in modes of bringing religious 
freedom and other fundamental human rights to life under diverse cultural 
circumstances. Those elements, if any, that European societies seek to agree 
upon as common may at least serve as minimum standards for the protection of 
freedom of religion or belief. To this extent, a minimum degree of coherence and 
consistency is required. It would otherwise be impossible to include the protection 
of freedom of religion or belief as one of the pillars of EU external human rights 
action.’50 
Without this as Marco Ventura writes: 
‘Europe lacks the credibility and authority to denounce and counter violations in 
other parts of the world’.51  
In the event that the court does opt to allow member states to take different 
approaches in this regard and enable national courts to permit discrimination of the 
nature demonstrated in the two case being considered, it would then perhaps be 
time to re-examine the notion of ‘neutrality’ and ‘secularism’ in more detail from a 
philosophical and ideological perspective. If it enables either a nation state or private 
enterprise to drive religion out of the public sphere it then becomes a single concept 
ideology of its own – its own belief system that operates to the exclusion of all 
others. Not only does this ignore the fact that 84% of the world’s population 
according to the Pew Report52 acknowledge allegiance to one form of religion or 
another, within the European Union 74% are adherents to the Christian faith, but it 
also makes a claim that theoretically, practically and historically has not born fruit 
over time – traditionally where freedom to manifest religion in public life is restricted 
other rights abuses have followed and society deteriorates. 
																																																											
49 Pasquale Annicchino Coherence (and Constistency) or Organised Hypocrisy? Religious Freedom 
in the Law of the European Union, in Marie-Claire Foblets, Katayoun Alidadi, Jørgen S Nielsen, 
Zeynep Yanasmayan (eds) (2014) Belief, Law and Politics, What Future for a Secular Europe?, 
Ashgate, Farnham, 257-263. The three pillars of coherence identified by Annicchino in Marise 
Cremona’s work (Foblets et al (2014), 258) would be missing in Advocate General Kokkots approach, 
there would first be a lack of consistency in the rules for avoiding conflict. Second, there would be a 
lack of rules of hierarchy – with the balancing of a Charter right not usually set in the hierarchy of 
fundamental rights (freedom to run a business) accorded the status of fundamental right and weighed 
against  a down graded religious freedom equality right and third a lack of synergy between norms, 
actors and instruments with freedom of religion being accorded a different treatment within the 
European Convention of Human Rights and other international instruments. See also Annicchino ‘A 
transatlantic Partnership for International Religious Freedom? The United States, Europe, and the 
Challenge of Religious Persecution’. (2016) OJLR 5(2): 280, 287-289. 
50 Annicchino in Marie-Claire Foblet et al (2014), 262-263.	
51 Annicchino in Marie-Claire Foblet et al (2014), 263. 
52  http://www.globalreligiousfutures.org  
	 19	
A way forward can be found in the work of the Equalities and Human Rights 
Commission in the UK which is currently looking to improve understanding in the 
practice of employers in managing religious diversity in the workplace and balancing 
that right with other rights; creating a balanced public dialogue on religion and belief 
matters and; assessing the legal framework in the field53. The last of these tasks was 
addressed by Edge and Vickers in a report for the Commission in 201554. Further 
inspiration for fostering religious tolerance generally can also be found in the work of 
the Commission on Religion and Belief in Public Life55 and, within the work place, in 
the literature on reasonable accommodation both in the US, Canada and Europe56.  
Conclusion 
This case comment has contrasted the opinions of Advocate General’s Sharpston 
and Kokott in the Bougnaoui and Achbita cases in order to highlight some of the 
issues raised by them. In particular the importance of religious belief to the concept 
of human identity and dignity and the problems that might arise if the CJEU were to 
raise business freedom to the level of fundamental right in the light of rights 
protection generally and in the balancing of rights exercise it has to undertake under 
equality legislation. It also examined the difference between the ability of the ECtHR 
to apply the margin of appreciation and the limits on the CJEU in the application of a 
non-uniform approach to decision making. It suggested that the CJEU should not 
avoid examining state ideology where it comes into play in cases arising under anti-
discrimination legislation where that state ideology itself might infringe international 
fundamental rights norms. This might require the CJEU to reassess the notion of 
‘neutrality’ and ‘secularism’ as an ideological concept, which effectively excludes all 
other ideologies but its own from the public square. It then considered the 
importance of coherent internal and external freedom of religion policies if the EU 
Special Envoy for Freedom of Religion is to be able to go out with credibility to third 
countries. It is hoped that the Court of Justice in its rulings in Bougnaoui and Achbita 
will chose an approach which accords with member states views, reinforces freedom 
of religion and hence tolerant living together and creates internal and external 
coherence for freedom of religion and belief.  
 
January 2017  
 
 
																																																											
53 Shared understandings: a new EHRC strategy to strengthen understanding of religion or belief in 
public life. (2013); Perfect 2014. 
54 Peter Edge and Lucy Vickers. Review of equality and human rights law relating to religion or belief. 
Equality and Human Rights Commission. Research report 97 (2015).		
55	http://www.corab.org.uk	In	particular	see	the	Living	with	Difference	Report:	http://tinyurl.com/h22hb22		
56 See, for example, the series in (2016) OJLR 5(2) and 5(3). In particular Ann Power-Forde Freedom 
of Religion and ‘Reasonable Accommodation’ in the Case Law of the European Court of Human 
Rights’. (2016) OJLR 5(3): 575.  
